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L INTRODUCTION 
Underlying the hyperbole in the Ranch's brief, the Ranch's entire argument is 
constructed to support a single proposition - that an intransigent landowner may block 
the Trust and the Trust's lessee (in this case Marion) from accessing oil and gas deposits 
owned by the Trust simply by refusing to permit access to those minerals. 
The Ranch tries to draw the Court's attention away from this simple, unassailable 
fact by arguing that "[i]t is not true that Marion/SITLA are prevented from accessing 
SITLA's oil and gas deposits" because "the legislature has granted a lease holder like 
Marion the limited right to enter upon the land in which it holds SITLA mineral leases." 
Brief of Appellee at 47 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 53C-2-401, et seq.). 
It is most significant that the Ranch rewrites the Record, when the fact is that there 
is no access to the minerals leased by Marion from the Trust except over land owned by 
the Ranch - the Trust's mineral leases are "landlocked" by virtue of being literally 
surrounded by surface lands owned by the Ranch. (R000092.) 
The Ranch further argues that "eminent domain should only be used when 
necessary to accomplish a clearly stated public goal - not as a means to establish the most 
cost-effective method of establishing that goal." Brief of Appellee at 47 (emphasis 
added). On that point, the Trust and Marion agree. The Trust's minerals - its oil and gas 
deposits at issue here - simply cannot be accessed without the power of condemnation. 
Condemnation thus is absolutely necessary to accomplish the well-articulated and 
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constitutionally mandated public policy of maximizing the value of Trust assets for the 
benefit of the schoolchildren and institutional beneficiaries of the Trust. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TERM "MINERAL DEPOSITS" AS USED IN SECTION 501(6)(a) 
MUST INCLUDE OIL AND GAS IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND PURPOSE. 
A court's "primary goal when construing statutes is to evince 'the true intent and 
purpose of the Legislature [as expressed through] the plain language of the Act.'" Hall v. 
Utah State Dept. of Corr., 2001 UT 34, Tf 15, 24 P.3d 958 (quoting Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). When properly 
viewed as a whole, there can be no doubt or question that the legislature has evidenced an 
intent and purpose to facilitate the development of oil and gas reserves on lands owned 
by the Trust. The term "mineral deposits," as used in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
501(6)(a), must include oil and gas in order to effectuate the Legislature's intent and 
purpose. 
1. TRUST LANDS ARE DEDICATED TO AND MUST BE USED FOR 
THE BENEFIT OF THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE TRUST. 
Article XX, Section 2 of Utah's Constitution, titled "School and Institutional Trust 
Lands," provides that lands granted to the State "are declared to be school and 
institutional trust lands, held in trust by the State for the respective beneficiaries and 
purposes stated in the Enabling Act grants." 
In turn, Utah's Enabling Act articulates the requirement that the "proceeds of 
lands herein granted for educational purposes, . . . shall constitute a permanent school 
2 
fund/' and that such lands granted "shall be held, appropriated, and disposed of 
exclusively for the purposes herein mentioned, in such manner as the legislature of the 
State may provide." 28 Stat. 107 (July 16, 1894). 
The School and Institutional Trust Lands Management Act (the "Management 
Act"), Utah Code Ann. Title 53C, provides that the Congressional grant of lands to the 
State "imposes upon the state a perpetual trust obligation to which standard trust 
principles are applied," and which trust principles "impose fiduciary duties upon the 
state, including . . . a strict requirement to administer the trust corpus for the exclusive 
benefit of the trust beneficiaries." Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-102 (l)(b), (2)(a). 
Moreover, the Management Act calls for the title to "be liberally construed to enable the 
board of trustees, the director and the administration to faithfully fulfill the state's 
obligations to the trust beneficiaries." Id. at § 53C-1-102 (3) (emphasis added). 
As a fiduciary with responsibility to the Trust's beneficiaries, the Trust is required 
to "obtain the optimum values from use of trust lands and revenues for the trust 
beneficiaries. . . ." Id. at § 53C-l-302(l)(b)(iii). In furtherance of this purpose, the 
Management Act provides for issuance of mineral leases for "prospecting, exploring, 
developing and producing minerals." Id. at § 53C-2-405; see generally id. at § 53C-2-
401, et seq.. Mineral leasing under the Management Act, a critical component of the 
Trust's constitutional and statutory duties, includes the leasing of oil and gas because the 
term "c[m]ineraF includes oil, gas, and hydrocarbons." Id. at § 53C-1-103(4). 
2. THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO ACCESS STATE-
OWNED MINERALS HAS LONG BEEN AUTHORIZED IN UTAH. 
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Starting in 1898, the Legislature expressly has authorized the power of eminent 
domain to access the State's minerals. In Utah Revised Statute Chapter 65, titled 
Eminent Domain, the Legislature expressly provided that the power of eminent domain 
could be exercised for: 
3588.6 Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and 
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of 
ores, or the working of mines; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit 
or conduct of tailings, refuse, or water from mills, smelters or other works 
for the reduction of ores, or from mines; mill dams; natural gas or oil pipe 
lines, tanks, or reservoirs; . . . . 
(Emphasis added) (R.000137-138). 
As long ago as 1909, the Legislature expressly included the term "mineral 
deposits" in the condemnation statute. See Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall 
ConsoL Mining Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172, 174-75 (Utah 1918) (quoting and 
analyzing Comp. Laws 1907, § 3588, as amended by Chapter 47, Laws Utah 1909, p.50). 
Through these enactments, the Legislature clearly, and long ago, articulated "the 
intention of the legislative power of this state to declare mining generally and the 
development of mines and mineral deposits a public use, in furtherance of which the 
right of the exercise of eminent domain was applied with full force and effect." Id. at 175 
(emphasis added). 
3. SECTION 501(6)(a) FURTHERS THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE 
THAT TRUST LANDS BE UTILIZED FOR THE MAXIMUM 
BENEFIT OF THE TRUST'S BENEFICIARIES. 
The adoption of the Judicial Code, § 78B-6-501, did not alter the long-standing 
and well-established precedent either as to the State's power of condemnation or the 
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obligations of the Trust act for the benefit of the Trust beneficiaries. Rather, the Code 
continues the grant of the power of eminent domain for: "(6) (a) roads, . . . [and] pipes, 
. . . to facilitate the . . . working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits 
including minerals in solution;" as well as for "(d) gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or 
reservoirs." (Emphasis added). 
B. SECTION 501(6)(a) INCLUDED OIL AND GAS BOTH BY ITS EXPRESS 
TERMS AND BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION. 
As the Ranch acknowledges, the State may exercise the power of eminent domain 
when a statute grants such authority "in express terms or by necessary implication." 
Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 54, 414 P.2d 963, 969 
(Utah 1966) (Callister, J., dissenting) (cited in Brief of Appellee at 10); see also 
Bertagnoli v. Baker, 111 Utah 348, 351-52, 215 P.2d 626, 627-28 (Utah 1950) (cited in 
Brief of Appellee at 11). 
In this case, Section 501(6)(a) grants the power to condemn land necessary to 
access the Trust's oil and gas deposits, in order to fulfill the Trust's mandate to maximize 
the value of its assets for the benefit of the Trust beneficiaries, because oil and gas are 
included within the term "mineral deposits," either expressly or by necessary implication. 
1. MORE THAN 100 YEARS OF PRECEDENT FROM THIS COURT 
MANDATES A FINDING THAT OIL AND GAS ARE INCLUDED 
WITHIN THE TERM "MINERAL DEPOSITS" AS USED IN 
SECTION 501(6)(a). 
Starting in 1907, the courts of this state, and courts construing those precedents, 
consistently have held that the term "minerals" includes oil and gas deposits. The 
Ranch's efforts to distinguish this line of authority are unpersuasive at best. 
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In Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 P. 53, 54 (Utah 
1907), the court construed the phrase "or other valuable mineral deposits," and held that 
"it was intended that all mineral deposits should be taxed in this way, and not only the 
metalliferous minerals and coal." Id. at 57 (emphasis added). 
The Ranch attempts to distinguish Nephi Plaster by noting that the case did not 
arise in the context of an eminent domain action, Brief of Appellee at 27. While this 
distinction is true, the Ranch fails to demonstrate that Nepli Plaster is not convincing 
authority for how the Court should continue to interpret the legislative use of the term 
"mineral" in the context of contemporaneous legislation. 
The Ranch fails to acknowledge that Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham 
Consol. Mining Co., 69 Utah 423, 255 P. 672 (Utah 1926), was a condemnation action. 
Instead, the Ranch maintains that the Trust and Marion misconstrued Utah Copper 
because the "actual definition of 'mineral' was not even at issue." Brief of Appellee at 
27. 
Though the definition of "mineral" was not at issue, the Utah Copper court 
expressly noted that it was conceded the term "'mineral' is not limited to metal or 
metalliferous deposits but also includes petroleum and other liquids." 255 P. at 674 
(emphasis added). Moreover, though wholly ignored by the Ranch, the Utah Copper 
court also noted that it "may be conceded" that "oil and gas are minerals . . . ." Id. at 
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675 (emphasis added). Though these conceded points ultimately failed to support Utah 
Copper defendants' claims, they nevertheless reflect clear pronouncements by this Court 
that the scope of the definition of "minerals" in the context of the condemnation statue 
includes oil and gas. 
The Ranch also seeks to diminish the significance of the holding in Western 
Development Company v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (Utah 1955), because that 
case involved the examination of a "deed[] of conveyance - not statutes - to determine 
the scope and meaning of the term 'mineral' as used" in the deed. Brief of Appellee at 
29. Curiously, though, the Ranch acknowledges that "there is a rule of interpretation that 
finds the term 'mineral,' as used in a reservation of rights in a license, lease or deed, is 
presumed to include oil and gas, unless there is an ambiguity on the face of the 
document." Brief of Appellee at 38. The Ranch fails to explain, however, why such a 
presumption does not, or should not, apply to the interpretation of a statute, such as 
Section 501(6)(a), particularly in light of the precedential history cited by Marion and the 
Trust. 
Moreover, the Ranch's argument is belied by the long-standing principle that the 
Legislature is presumed to be aware of court decisions when enacting legislation. See, 
1
 The Ranch maintains that "[c]learly, the Court was not conceding that the term 
'mineral' includes 'petroleum and other liquids;' rather, the Court was making it clear 
that even if it does, this would not affect the Court's ruling as to ownership." Brief of 
Appellee at 28-29. For the stated reasons, the Trust and Marion assert that by its plain 
language the Court in fact made a clear statement on the scope the term "mineral" and the 
inclusion of "petroleum and other liquids" within its definition. This Court will 
determine the proper reading of Utah Copper. However, for the Ranch to assert that 
Marion and the Trust were "misleading" in their use of Utah Copper (one of several ad 
hominem arguments in the Ranch's brief) is simply uncalled for. 
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e.g., Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1996). Thus, the Legislature, in enacting 
Section 501(6)(a), presumptively was aware, as was the Tenth Circuit when it decided 
Anschutz Land and Livestock Co. v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 820 F.2d 338, 343 (10th Cir. 
1987), that, under Utah law, the term "other minerals" had been held, "as a matter of 
law[,]" to encompass oil and gas interests. 
Nor is the Ranch's reliance on Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, \ 32, 104 
P.3d 1208, persuasive. The Ranch's argument that "this Court has specifically held that 
the term 'mineral' has no fixed or definite meaning, and what the term actually means 
depends on the context" in which it is used, is misplaced. Brief of Appellee at 15 (citing 
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, If 32, 104 P.3d 1208). The issue determined by 
the Carrier court was not a consideration of a ejusdem generis meaning of the term 
"mineral." Instead, the more specific question of whether gravel was included within the 
definition of "mineral" and, in that light concluded: "Whether the term 'mineral' actually 
incorporates the term 'gravel' in any given situation, however, is largely contextual." Id4 
2
 The Ranch argues that Marion and the Trust are disingenuous in asserting that the 
Anschutz court held, as a matter of law, that minerals included oil and gas. The Ranch's 
assertion simply is not correct. The Anschutz court quoted with approval the holding of 
the district court, which examined the Western Development holding, in concluding that 
"the language in Reservation A is plain, clear and without ambiguity. The term 'other 
minerals' includes oil and gas . . . ." 820 F.2d at 343. The court continued to hold, like 
the district court, that the clause in Reservation A was "sufficient to encompass oil and 
gas interests as a matter of law." Id. 
3
 Because Carrier is readily distinguished from the case at bar, the election of Marion 
and the Trust not to address the case in the Brief of Appellants truly is not "surprising." 
{See Brief of Appellee at 9 n.5.) 
4
 As stated in Carrier: "[W]hether gravel is appropriately deemed a mineral depends on 
the context in which the term is used." 2004 UT 98, \ 34. 
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The narrow focus of the Carrier decision thus renders its application to the proper 
construction of Section 501(6)(a) negligible at best. 
2. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ARE UNNECESSARY 
IN LIGHT OF THE INCLUSION OF OIL AND GAS IN MINERAL 
DEPOSITS BY EXPRESS TERMS OR NECESSARY 
IMPLICATION, 
The Ranch takes Marion and the Trust to task for their "lengthy discussion of why 
the doctrine of ejusdem generis does not apply, without showing why they believe the 
trial court's decision was unsupported." Brief of Appellee at 22-23. The Ranch misses 
the point completely. Tools of statutory construction are inapplicable where the meaning 
of a statutory provision is express or necessarily implied, as is the case here. See, e.g., 
Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 896 P.2d 632, 633-34 (Utah 1995). 
In fact, this Court has cautioned against the unrestrained use of principles of 
statutory construction, such as ejusdem generis, to bypass or limit the intent of the 
Legislature: 
The doctrine of ejusdem generis is but a rule of construction ... and is 
intended to aid in ascertaining the meaning of the Legislature, and does not 
warrant a court in confining the operation of a statute within narrower 
limits than intended by the lawmakers. The general object of an act 
sometimes requires that the final general term not be restricted in meaning 
by its more specific predecessors. 
Nephi Plaster, 93 P. at 58 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). 
The lack of authority for Ranch's argument is demonstrated by its unsupported 
insistence that "the legislature must expressly include 4oil and gas; in connection with the 
use of the term 'mineral deposits' if it wants to ensure oil and gas is included." Brief of 
Appellee at 40. Such a proposition reads the concept of "necessary implication" out of 
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this Court's jurisprudence, creates a novel rule of statutory construction, and would place 
an untenable burden of precision on the Legislature to itemize every "mineral9" for which 
the power of eminent domain may be exercised. 
3. THE RANCH'S ANALYSIS OF SECTION 501(6)(d) IS 
INAPPOSITE, AS IS ITS RELIANCE ON SECTION 40-8-4(6)(b). 
The Ranch, as did the district court, relies on the Legislature's use of the words 
"gas" and "oil" in Section 501(6)(d) and their exclusion in Section 501(6)(a). See Brief 
of Appellee at 19. Both the district court and the Ranch err, however, by failing to 
consider and appreciate the distinct purposes of each of these Sections. 
Section 501(6)(d), by its express terms, deals with "pipelines, tanks or reservoirs." 
Without more, it would be impossible to determine any statutory parameters on the scope 
of the condemnation powers granted thereunder for those types of facilities. There may 
be any number of uses for "pipelines, tanks or reservoirs." The Legislature provides clear 
limits to this Section by specifying the types of "pipelines, tanks or reservoirs" for which 
it had authorized the use of the powers of eminent domain. In the case of Section 
501(6)(d), the powers of condemnation are available for "gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks 
or reservoirs" for "underground natural gas storage facilities." See also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-6-501(6)(9) (for sewerage) and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(6)(10) (for 
supplying and storing water for generating and transmitting electricity for power, light 
and heat). These limitations do not, and cannot, unwrite the grant of roads to access 
mineral deposits, including oil and gas, set forth in Section 501(6)(a). 
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The same is not true for Section 501(6)(a). By using the words "mineral deposits 
including deposits in solution/' and relying upon the well-defined and articulated case 
law construing the terms "mineral deposits" and "minerals," the Legislature accurately 
and succinctly defined the scope of the powers being conveyed.5 
The Ranch also argues that because the Legislature, in enacting Utah Code Ann. § 
40-8-4(6)(b) - the basis for separate regulatory authority over non-oil and gas minerals -
chose to expressly exclude oil and gas from the definition of the term "mineral deposit" 
"one cannot merely conclude that the term 'mineral deposits' necessarily includes 'oil 
and gas.'" Brief of Appellee at 15. In fact, if anything, the Legislature's express 
exclusion of oil and gas from the definition of "mineral deposit" confirms the argument 
advanced by Marion and the Trust; that is, in its normal and customary usage, the term 
"mineral deposits" includes oil and gas unless expressly defined otherwise. Thus, in 
This critical distinction between Section 501(6)(a) and Section 501(6)(d) demonstrates 
the erroneous basis for the Ranch's reliance on Carrier {see Brief of Appellee at 17-18). 
The Carrier court concluded that the use of the term "gravel pits" in two sections of the 
zoning ordinance but its omission in a third, was determinative because gravel pit 
operations were "inconsistent with the stated purpose" of the zone omitting the term 
"gravel pits" and, therefore, the term "mineral extraction and processing" as used in the 
zoning ordinance did not "encompass gravel pit operations." 2004 UT 98, \ 41. In the 
present case, however, there is no assertion that using the power of condemnation under 
Section 501(6)(a) is inconsistent with its stated purpose and, as set forth above, the use of 
the terms gas and oil in Section 501(6)(d) but not in Section 501(6)(a) is entirely 
consistent with the Legislative purpose to develop the Trust's minerals, which by 
statutory definition include oil and gas. Similarly, in State Land Brd. v. State DepL of 
Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707, 708 (1965), the phrase "all coal and other 
minerals" was held not to include sand and gravel in connection with a statutory 
reservation because such a reservation would "completely nullify the grant." In the 
present case, there is no argument that including oil and gas within the meaning of 
"mineral deposits," as used in Section 501(6)(a) would be fundamentally inconsistent 
with the purpose or intent of Section 501(6)(a). In fact, the opposite is true. 
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order to exclude oil and gas from the reach of the term "mineral deposit" in Section 40-8-
4(6)(b), the Legislature separately expressed the exclusion.6 By contrast, the Legislature 
could simply use the term "mineral deposit" in Section 501(6)(a) without qualification 
and thereby include, by express terms or necessary implication, oil and gas. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING WOULD CREATE AN ABSURD 
RESULT. 
The Ranch maintains that the district court's ruling, which denies the Trust access 
to its oil and gas deposits, and thus deprives the Trust the ability to produce the oil and 
gas for the benefit of the Trust beneficiaries, is "not an unfair or unexpected result." 
Brief of Appellee at 8. In fact, the opposite is true - to deny the Trust access to its oil and 
gas deposits is a patently unfair and an unexpected result that cannot be sanctioned by 
this Court. 
The Ranch argues that the Trust and Marion should appeal to the Legislature if 
they "desire to use eminent domain to take private property to construct permanent roads 
over private property rather than use pipelines." Brief of Appellee at 49. The Ranch 
wholly misses - or misstates - the point. 
The Trust and Marion do not seek to use the power of condemnation because 
roads are a more "cost-effective" means of transporting oil and gas than pipelines. The 
Trust and Marion seek to use the power of condemnation to be able to reach the Trust's 
oil and gas deposits in the first place. Simply stated - in the absence of an easement for a 
6
 See also, eg, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5(7), prescribing that the enforcement powers of 
the Board of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining has "enforcement powers with respect 
to operations of minerals other than oil and gas " (Emphasis added.) 
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road to access the oil and gas deposits none of the Trust's oil and gas ever will be 
exploited. The deposits will remain in the ground; proceeds of production for the benefit 
of the Trust beneficiaries halted by the recalcitrance of a landowner fortuitous enough to 
be blocking access to the Trust's landlocked deposits. Such a result would be the 
definition of absurd. 
The absurdity of the Ranch's position and the holding of the district court is 
highlighted by the holding in Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Utah 1979), 
where the court held that "the State of Utah and Cotter Corporation, as Utah's lessee, do 
have the right to cross federal land to reach Section 36, which is a portion of the school 
trust lands." The court reasoned, as related to the Trust's mandatory purposes, that even 
the United States could not block access because "[t]he state must be allowed access to 
the state school trust lands so that those lands can be developed in a manner that will 
provide funds for the common schools." Id. at 1009 (emphasis added). Further, as the 
Andrus court explained: 
Given the rule of liberal construction and the Congressional intent of 
enabling the state to use the school lands as a means of generating revenue, 
the court must conclude that Congress intended that Utah (or its lessees) 
have access to the school lands. Unless a right of access is inferred, the 
very purpose of the school trust lands would fail. Without access the state 
could not develop the trust lands in any fashion and they would become 
economically worthless. This Congress did not intend. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
It is absurd to maintain, as does the Ranch, that the power to condemn is limited as 
to oil and gas only for the purposes of conveyance and storage, but not for exploration 
and production of this vital public resource. 
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D. THE RANCH'S RELIANCE ON PROPOSED, BUT NEVER PASSED, 
LEGISLATION IS UNPERSUASIVE. 
The Ranch vainly argues that legislation once proposed by Senator Dmitrich, 
which sought to amend Section 501(6)(a), aimed "to add authority to take land for roads 
to access oil and gas deposits" and evidences that "the legislature must have recognized 
that authority was not included under the terms of the current statute." Appellee's Brief 
at 25. The Ranch's argument fails for two reasons. First, it is well-accepted that, as a 
matter of law, the failure of a proposed act to pass is of no precedential value. See, e.g., 
Moss v. Brd. ofComm'rs of Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P.2d 961 (Utah 1953) ("it 
is with their declaration in the enactment itself that we must be principally concerned in 
determining its meaning" (footnote omitted)); see also Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole 
Authority, 105 F.3d 1063, 1071 (6th Cir. 1997) ("statements made by persons in favor of 
a rejected or failed bill are meaningless and cannot be used as an extrinsic aid"). 
Second, even if an inference from the failure of the Legislature to pass a proposed 
amendment were permitted, it would be equally permissible to infer that the Legislature 
determined, as had this Court, that "mineral deposits," as used in Section 501(6)(a) 
already included oil and gas, thereby rendering the proposed amendment redundant and 
unnecessary. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For each of the foregoing reasons, Marion and the Trust respectfully request that 
this Court reverse the district court's Judgment, enter judgment for Marion and the Trust, 
and grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
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